{"id":1817,"date":"2022-07-19T20:41:42","date_gmt":"2022-07-20T00:41:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/americancompass.beckandstone.com\/pass-the-chips-please-2\/"},"modified":"2022-11-09T09:00:13","modified_gmt":"2022-11-09T14:00:13","slug":"pass-the-chips-please","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/americancompass.org\/pass-the-chips-please\/","title":{"rendered":"Pass the CHIPS, Please"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
Congress finally appears poised<\/a> to make progress on a competitiveness bill that focuses squarely on an especially pressing need: support for the domestic semiconductor industry. The case for doing this has been well made in numerous forums, from American Compass\u2019s own Guide to the Semiconductor Industry<\/a> and analysis at National Review<\/em><\/a> to the recent Wall Street Journal <\/em>op-ed<\/a> by Graham Allison and Eric Schmidt to the Reagan Institute\u2019s report<\/a> on Bolstering U.S. Production for National Security and Economic Prosperity, the final report of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence<\/a>, and the Department of Defense\u2019s 2022 supply chain review<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In short:<\/p>\n\n\n\n After numerous proposals, studies, and negotiations, Congress incorporated the \u201cCHIPS Act\u201d<\/a> in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021. The Senate amendment incorporating the CHIPS Act passed 96\u20134. The question now is whether Senators will vote to finalize and fund the programs that they already approved. They should do so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The weakness of the case against a semiconductor policy inadvertently illustrates the policy\u2019s strength. This morning\u2019s Wall Street Journal<\/em> editorial<\/a> makes this clear with counterarguments that are less arguments than an incoherent set of generic talking points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. The Journal<\/em> begins by warning, \u201cTaxpayers should at least know they\u2019ll be subsidizing highly profitable companies that don\u2019t need the help.\u201d This is a sloppy conflation of two different issues\u2014profitability and investment incentives. Of course, many semiconductor manufacturers are highly profitable. The policy goal here is not to boost their profits, but to alter their incentives to encourage domestic investment. \u201cThese companies make a lot of money\u201d is not an argument against encouraging investment that would be good for America.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Journal<\/em> knows this, because it is the logic that it applies to corporate tax cuts. Such cuts go, by definition, to profitable companies\u2014the more highly profitable, the greater the benefit. The case for them is that a lower tax rate will enhance the incentive to make investments\u2014\u201cmake the U.S. more competitive across the globe\u201d and \u201cmaking America more welcoming to investment,\u201d to quote a Journal<\/em> editorial<\/a> in favor of corporate tax cuts in 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. The Journal<\/em> tries to frame the policy as a belated and unnecessary response to pandemic-related chip shortages. (\u201cThe impetus for the bill was a severe pandemic chip shortage that disrupted supply chains and raised the cost of autos and many other products.\u201d) This is simply false. As noted above, policymakers have been working on the issue for the years, motivated by long-term trends that predate the pandemic and will persist long after. The precursor legislation to the CHIPS Act was introduced in mid-2020<\/a> with no reference to the pandemic or related shortages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. The Journal<\/em> claims that \u201cchip fabrication has moved to South Korea and Taiwan because many chips are commodities with low margins.\u201d This is, again, simply false. Taiwan is the unquestioned leader in fabricating the most advanced chips, at least a generation ahead of what U.S. foundries can do\u2014as reported<\/a> in the Wall Street Journal<\/em>. Just last month, Samsung began production of even more-advanced<\/a> chips. Of course, there\u2019s nothing in the Korean or Taiwanese soil that makes these places ideal for chip fabrication. There\u2019s just decades of aggressive industrial policy that makes it about 30% cheaper<\/a> to build a plant in those places rather than America, the vast majority of that gap driven by ongoing subsidies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4. The Journal<\/em> points to \u201c$80 billion in new U.S. investments through 2025,\u201d but much of that is contingent on exactly the policy that the Journal<\/em> would abandon. For instance, Intel has warned<\/a> its $20 billion Ohio investment depends on the CHIPS Act. A $5 billion GlobalWafers investment in Texas likewise hinges<\/a> on it. The Journal<\/em> notes that, \u201cSamsung plans to build a $17 billion factory in Texas. TSMC has a $12 billion plant under construction in Arizona.\u201d But as one Taiwanese official put it<\/a>, \u201cTSMC has already begun their construction in Arizona, basically because of trust. They believe the Chips Act will be passed by the Congress.\u201d Samsung\u2019s investment was likewise dependent<\/a> on government support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5. The Journal<\/em> tries to tar bill supporters with the accusation that they are enamored of Chinese-style planning: \u201cOne unfortunate impetus behind this bill is that, for all their talk of competing with China, many politicians believe that Beijing\u2019s economic planning is superior to the U.S. free-market system.\u201d But of course, the editorial includes no examples of someone making this argument, because no one has made it.What supporters do<\/em> argue is that, to quote the Reagan Institute<\/a>, \u201cAmerica must work cohesively with allies and partners to address the current challenge from state-centric economies whose industrial policies undermine [free-market] ideals and tilt the global economy in their favor.\u201d The problem here is that \u201cfree\u201d trade poses a threat to \u201cfree\u201d markets when the trade is with nations that aggressively distort investment incentives. The WSJ editorial board\u2019s market fundamentalism can\u2019t cope with this challenge, but policymakers have to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Journal<\/em> concludes with a cringe-worthy misunderstanding of \u201cSematech,\u201d the Reagan-era industry consortium that boosted semiconductor innovation beginning in the 1980s, in response to rising Japanese competition. The Journal<\/em>\u2019s evidence is an op-ed<\/a> it published last year by former Cypress Semiconductor CEO T.J. Rodgers, who wrote, \u201cthe government set up the Sematech chip consortium that \u2018was obsolescent when it opened.\u2019 But Intel innovated with more advanced chips.\u201d Rodgers says Sematech \u201cdid zero for the industry\u201d and demonstrates its obsolescence by noting that \u201clayoffs started in 2002.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Where to begin. First, Sematech began operating in the late 1980s. So, layoffs in 2002 would have been 15 years later, hardly evidence of \u201cobsolescence when it opened.\u201d Second, those layoffs weren\u2019t because of obsolescence, they were the result of budget cuts<\/a> after the dot-com bust. Layoffs occurred industry-wide, including at Intel, which laid off thousands of people<\/a> that year despite its impressive track record of innovation. (Incidentally, Intel played a leading role in Sematech.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Most assessments consider Sematech a success. \u201cWith a few vocal exceptions,\u201d concludes a National Academy of Sciences report<\/a>, \u201cSematech is widely credited within the U.S. industry with some role in stimulating a resurgence among U.S. semiconductor producers in the 1990s.\u201d The Academy also highlights \u201cthe revealed willingness of its corporate members to continue funding Sematech at levels exceeding earlier private contributions after public subsidies ended in 1996.\u201d That\u2019s right\u2014industry was investing alongside the government all along, and when the government program wound down, industry kept right on going. Those \u201cobsolescent\u201d layoffs of 2002 came much later.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Wall Street Journal<\/em> Accidentally Helps Make the Case<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n